Abstract: An approach is outlined for generalising the notion of bargaining power in cooperative game theory to identify a "political economy function" as a conceptual approach for analysing power within a general equilibrium framework.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137553737.0012
In this chapter, an approach is outlined for generalising the notion of bargaining power in cooperative game theory to identify a "political economy function" as a conceptual approach for analysing power within a general equilibrium framework. Rather than being a completely new theory (as tried by Bartlett) this function can be viewed simply as another way of thinking about the social welfare function -one that describes the prevailing political forces involved in determining economic outcomes. The political economy function, or PEF, therefore captures the notion of (positive) political economy equilibria in political economics rather than (normative) social preferences regarding equity, justice and so on, as in traditional welfare economics. If adopted as a tool in teaching and research, the PEF approach could bring power considerations to the fore instead of ignoring them as at present.
Recall that the welfare economics question ("Which is the best Pareto optimal outcome?") can be answered by specifying a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (SWF) and finding the "bliss point" -the point of tangency between the grand utility frontier and the isowelfare curves associated with the SWF -where social welfare is maximised subject to resource constraints. The problems associated with this solution are well known. In particular, the shape of the SWF and isowelfare curves reflect the views of society regarding the trade-off between efficiency and equity, but it is not clear who decides their shape. Since the decision involves a value judgement, and value judgements are necessarily subjective and individual, an SWF can never represent more than the views of just one individual. That individual may be a dictator, or a randomly chosen member of society (parodied as "individual No. 10" by Little, 1952, p. 424) , or a dominant class acting in unity, or perhaps not a real person at all but anthropomorphised tradition and custom (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972, pp. 72-73) . However, these problems arise only because the SWF seeks to identify the social optimum, which is not our concern here: we are not concerned with which state "ought" to be chosen or "should" be chosen (a normative issue), but simply with the state that actually emerges from the interplay of economic and political forces in society (a positive issue).
Mishan (1981, p. 130) suggests that the "tacit assumption has always been that the SWF is a political construct". Let us turn that tacit assumption into an explicit purpose. The function we are looking for does not represent an attempt to obtain a unique measure of social welfare, but instead represents the power relations within society. It
